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ADVANCE TOWARD “PEOPLE’S COURT” IN SOUTH 
KOREA 
 
Yong Chul Park† 
 
Abstract:  Since 2008, criminal jury trials have been implemented in South 
Korea with the Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials Act.  Under the Act, defendants 
have the option to choose a jury trial over a bench trial, although jury verdicts, as well as 
sentencing opinions rendered by a jury, are not binding on the court pursuant to Article 
46(2) of the Act.  While Korea’s adoption of a criminal jury trial was an ambitious move 
toward judicial reform, it has faced serious obstacles and has had limited influence over 
the Korean judicial system.  In this Article, I use the five stages of planned legal change 
identified in Malcolm Feeley’s book titled Court Reform on Trial (1983) as an analytical 
framework to explain why the criminal jury trial might not be the best way to regain the 
public’s confidence in the system and what should be done to better the system.   
 
Cite as: Yong Chul Park, Advance Toward “People’s Court” in South Korea, 27 WASH.  
INT’L L.J. 177 (2017). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Studying the four reforms [diagnosis, initiation, 
implementation, and routinization] in this manner, we can 
assess the success of each more realistically than has so far 
been done.  At the same time, we can learn how the process of 
change operates in the criminal courts and why it often leads to 
mixed and confusing results.1 
  
The Constitution of South Korea was last amended in 19872 as a result 
of the June Struggle,3 in which people demonstrated against the government 
to demand direct election of the President.4  The Constitution has proven 
                                                 
† Professor of Law, Sogang University Law School, Seoul, South Korea.   
1  MALCOLM M. FEELEY, COURT REFORM ON TRIAL: WHY SIMPLE SOLUTIONS FAIL 35 (1983). 
2  See DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] [CONSTITUTION] (S. Kor.). The 1987 Constitution of 
South Korea has very “detailed Bill of Rights provisions regarding criminal procedural rights.” For that 
reason, this phenomenon has been called “constitutionalization of criminal procedure.” However, such 
“constitutionalization” did not take the people’s factor into account. See generally Kuk Cho, The Exclusion 
of Illegally Obtained Confessions, Electronic Communications and Physical Evidence in Korea, 13 J. 
KOREAN L. 175 (2014).  
3  Intraman, The 6.10 Democracy Movement, KOREA BRIDGE (June 6, 2011, 3:45 PM), 
http://koreabridge.net/post/610-democracy-movement-610-%EB%AF%BC%EC%A3%BC%ED%95% 
AD% EC%9F%81-intraman. See generally JUSTINE GUICHARD, REGIME TRANSITION AND THE JUDICIAL 
POLITICS OF ENMITY: DEMOCRATIC INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION IN SOUTH KOREAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
JUSTICE 23–46 (2016). 
4 Kyung-Soo Shim, A Study on the Problem of Political Power Structure under the Current 
Constitution, 62 DONG-A L.J. 23, 36–37 (2014) (S. Kor.). 
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resilient over thirty years of revolutionary change, including the 
development of direct presidential elections.  Over time, the Constitution 
and the expansion of policies facilitating public involvement resulted in an 
increased desire for public participation in the criminal justice system.5  
 
This public demand for heightened involvement in the criminal justice 
system was triggered by the establishment of the Constitutional Court and its 
subsequent growing legitimacy.6  With public recognition that, while there is 
no absolute law, the law profoundly affects people’s everyday lives in the 
real world, the establishment of the Constitutional Court by the 1987 
Constitution led to the rejection of the absolutism that existed since the birth 
of the country.7  The public’s strong desire to engage in legislating, 
implementing, and changing current laws has created an opportunity for the 
public’s opinion to solidify the existence of Constitutional Court.   
 
In concert with these developments, the public distrusted the existing 
criminal justice system.8  In multiple instances, illegitimate political regimes 
brought fabricated charges against innocent defendants.9  Many of these 
charges resulted in the execution of innocent people.10  This abuse of the 
judiciary left a permanent stain on the courts and ensured that the public 
distrusted South Korea’s overall criminal justice system.11  That distrust led 
the public to demand change to the criminal justice system; this was the 
most critical driving force behind any attempt for justice reform in twenty-
first century South Korea.12 
 
The increased engagement of the public, the confidence in the 
Constitutional Court, and the enormous distrust of the criminal justice 
system led the people of South Korea to propose changes to the criminal 
justice system.13  One suggested approach was for the people to elect judges 
                                                 
5  Jaesuk Lee, The Final Format of the Korean Jury Trial System, 59 L. Rev. 417, 420–21 (2014) (S. 
Kor.). 
6  Ki-Choon Song, An Appraisal of the Rule of Law during the Participatory Government (2003-
2008) in Korea, 35 PUB. L.J. 297, 313–14 (2007) (S. Kor.). 
7  Jeong-In Yun & Seon-Taek Kim, Constitutional Court as a Guardian of Democracy, 16 PUB. L.J. 
135, 141 (2015) (S. Kor.). 
8  Dong-Hee Lee, The Achievements and Challenges of the Citizen Participatory Trial in Korea, 146 
JUSTICE 69, 72–73 (2015) (S. Kor.). 
9  Deok-In Lee, The Justification on the Abolition of Death Penalty: The Judicial Murder and 
Wrongful Convictions of the Death Penalty, 12 CHUNG-ANG L. REV. 111, 122–33 (2010) (S. Kor.). 
10  Id. at 126. 
11  Yun & Kim, supra note 7, at 136. 
12  Tae Hoon Ha, Public Trust in Justice, 134 JUSTICE 575, 577 (2013) (S. Kor.). 
13  Id. at 587. 
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who would be attentive to the public’s opinion whenever they had to render 
important decisions affecting millions of voters’ lives.14  Another suggestion 
was to guarantee seats at the Supreme Court of South Korea for non-lawyer 
candidates, thus ensuring that the justices in the highest court of the Country 
would consider how the general public would think when making their 
decisions.15  
 
While some of these ideas are still viable, only the use of jury trials 
received sufficient support from the public to actively develop it.16  
However, the successful launch of the criminal jury trial was not without 
concern, as many worried that people’s direct involvement in the criminal 
justice process would aggravate their distrust of the system rather than 
alleviate it.17  The public worried that fairness of the jury verdict and 
sentencing opinion could be tainted.18  Some were concerned that lay people 
would not be sufficiently trained to distinguish between the true and false 
facts produced by both parties at trial.19  Others expressed discomfort 
because jury trials forced defendants to reveal details of their private lives to 
lay people, making defendants more likely to lose face publicly during the 
trial process.20   
  
Yet the National Assembly chose the criminal jury trial because it 
viewed this approach as the most revolutionary and democratic solution to 
the public confidence crisis.  The year 2008 marked the inception of criminal 
jury trials in South Korea.21  An Act titled “Citizen Participation in Criminal 
Trials” (“the Act”) solidified the jury trial as a part of the South Korean 
                                                 
14  A bill regarding direct election of the chief justice and other fellow justices was devised and 
passed by the National Assembly in 1961. Daebeop-won jangmitdae beopgwan seon-geobeop-an [Chief 
Justice and Judges Election Bill], Act No. 050164, Jan. 13, 1961 (S. Kor.), 
http://likms.assembly.go.kr/bill/billDetail.do?billId=003206. However, attempts to introduce direct 
democracy into the judicial branch were subverted by a military regime led by President Jung-Hee Park in 
the following years. 
15  See generally Younghoon Kim, Seeking a Judicial Personnel System to Protect Judicial 
Independence, 27 YONSEI L. REV. 1 (2017) (detailing the long-debated assertion that enhancing diversity in 
the Supreme Court would be beneficial in terms of guaranteeing the fairness of court) (S. Kor.).   
16  Dong Eon Cha, The Effect of the Jury System on Development of Democracy, 5 SEOUL NAT’L U. 
L. REV. 166, 168–69 (2015) (S. Kor.). 
17  Id. at 168. 
18  Id. 
19  Byung-Soo Kim, The Realization of a Fair Participatory Trial by Division of Fact-Finding and 
Sentencing, 27 J. KOREAN L. 109, 113–14 (2015) (S. Kor.). 
20  See generally Ho-Kyum Kim & Kwang-Sub Park, A Study of the Methods for Activation of Jury 
Trial System in Korea, 24 CHUNGNAM L. REV. 301 (2013) (S. Kor.). 
21 Jae-Hyup Lee, Korean Jury Trial: Has the New System Brought About Changes?,  12 ASIAN-PAC. 
L. & POL’Y J. 58, 59 (2010).   
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criminal justice system.22  Its title also reinforced the importance of “citizen 
participation” in the criminal justice system.23  
 
South Korea’s inclusion of jury trials in its criminal justice system is 
perceived by criminal law scholars and the public alike as democratic 
because it guarantees the public’s involvement in every phase of a criminal 
trial.24  Furthermore, the Act was structured to minimize any interference 
from professional judges in rendering verdicts and giving opinions on 
sentencing.25  For example, Article 46(2) limits the role of the judges by 
providing that “the jury may hear opinions of judges who take part in the 
trial when a majority of jurors requests to do so.”  Additionally, under the 
Act, defendants have the option to choose a jury trial over a bench trial.26  
However, a jury verdict, as well as a sentencing opinion rendered or 
recommended by that jury, will not be binding on the court pursuant to 
Article 46(5) of the Act.27  
 
The adoption of the criminal jury trial started with an ambitious move 
towards the revolution of the criminal justice system as a part of judicial 
reform.  However, this reform had a limited influence over the criminal 
justice system as a whole.28  Thus, the groundbreaking solution to 
                                                 
22   Gukmin-ui hyongsajaepan chamyeo-e gwanhan beopryul [Act on Citizen Participation in Criminal 
Trials], Act No. 8495, June 1, 2007, amended by Act No. 10258, Apr. 15, 2010, amended by Act No. 
11155, Jan. 17, 2012, amended by Act No. 11690, Mar. 23, 2013, amended by Act No. 12844, Nov. 19, 
2014, amended by Act No. 13762, Jan. 19, 2016, amended by Act No. 14184, May 29, 2016 (S. 
Kor.), translated in  Korea Legislation Research Institute online 
database, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/main.do (search required) [hereinafter Act on Citizen 
Participation in Criminal Trials]. 
23  Jin-yeon Chung, Juror as the Representative of the Citizens in the Civil Participation in Criminal 
Jury Trial, 21 SOONGSIL L. REV. 201, 203–04 (2009) (S. Kor.). 
24  Cha, supra note 16, at 175–76. 
25  Article 46(3) of the Act provides that “if the jury fails to reach an unanimous verdict of guilt or 
non-guilt, the jury shall hear opinions of judges who take part in the trial before delivering a verdict. In 
such cases, a verdict of guilt or non-guilt shall be concluded by a majority decision. Judges who take part in 
the trial shall not participate in the verdict, even in cases where they attend the deliberation and make 
statements on their opinions.” Act on Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials, art. 46(3). This Article 
expresses the Act’s intent to minimize the influence from the bench in criminal jury trials. However, there 
is some counter argument that judge intervention is rather excessive. Oh-Geol Kwon, Korean Jury Trial 
System: Present and Future, 44 L. REV. 225, 239–40 (2011) (S. Kor.). 
26  Kwon, supra note 25, at 233–34. Article 8 provides that a court needs to assure a defendant of 
his/her right to a participatory trial to the maximum. Act on Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials, art. 8. 
27  Article 46(5) of the Act provides that “No verdict and opinions under paragraphs (2) through (4) 
shall be binding on the court.” Act on Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials, art. 46(5). 
28  Kwon, supra note 25, at 229–30. 
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revolutionize the criminal justice system through criminal jury trials must be 
re-examined in order to better South Korea’s system.29   
 
 This Article uses the five stages of planned legal change identified in 
Malcolm Feeley’s book Court Reform on Trial as an analytical framework to 
explain why the South Korean criminal jury trial might not be the best way 
to regain the public’s confidence in the system, and what should be done in 
order to better the system.  Feeley identifies the following five stages: 1) 
diagnosis or conception, where, through “the process of identifying 
problems and considering solutions, . . . different perspectives lead people to 
identify different problems and suggest different remedies;” 2) initiation, 
where “new functions are added or practices are significantly altered . . . . 
This stage requires several decisions [regarding] [w]hich of several 
alternatives will be adopted[];” 3) implementation, “involving staffing, 
clarifying goals, and adapting to a new environment;” 4) routinization, 
“which involves commitment by an institution to supply funding and a 
physical base of operations;” and 5) evaluation, “in which new programs are 
usually assessed during their experimental stages rather than their routine 
periods. . . .”30  This Article argues that the adoption of the criminal jury trial 
cannot be the best solution to reform the court because both the audience and 
influence that the jury may create in the entire criminal justice system are 
fairly limited.   
 
II.   IMPORTANT STAGES IN THE PROCESS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM  
 
A.   Stage One: Diagnosis of the Problem 
  
 This section provides a historical overview of the criminal justice 
system in South Korea and describes the perception problem that has 
impeded the operation of the criminal justice system. 
 
1.   A Brief Political and Legal History of South Korea  
 South Korea is a young democracy.31  It was established in 1948, 
three years after World War II.32  At that time, United States troops marched 
                                                 
29  Many scholars, even those with the opinion that the Act does not need constitutional amendment 
in order to make the Act constitutional, argue that the Act does need some changes. B. Kim, supra note 19, 
at 112–16; Kwon, supra note 25, at 229–32. 
30  FEELEY, supra note 1, at xiii.   
31  Soon-Won Kang, Democracy and Human Rights Education in South Korea, 38 COMP. EDUC. 
315–16 (2002). 
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in the south of the Korean peninsula while Soviet troops occupied the area 
north of the 38th parallel.33  The country was sharply divided between the 
people who led the independence movement and the people loyal to the 
Imperial Japanese occupational regime.34  Democracy and socialism were 
fiercely debated due to the different ideological backgrounds of political 
leaders.35  Even after a leader was elected as the President, the country was 
without any proper governing system, not to mention a legal structure that 
courts could rely on.36  Lacking a legal structure of its own, South Korea 
resorted to using Japanese laws for quite some time.37  The young country 
struggled as a place where people could barely make a living, and it could 
not afford any room for developing its own legal culture.38  Making matters 
worse, in 1950, South Korea became engulfed in the Korean War.  Active 
warfare ended with a truce between the United Nations and North Korea in 
1953.39 However, the Korean Peninsula was devastated, with 2.5 million 
dead and a destroyed socio-economic infrastructure that prevented future 
development of the country.40  Immediately after the end of active hostilities, 
South Korea, one of the poorest countries in the world, found itself engaging 
in global politics with virtually no means to build or re-build its economy.41  
 
Unfortunately, the first three ostensibly democratically-elected 
Presidents, Syngman Lee (1948-1960), Junghee Park (1961-1979), and Doo-
hwan Jun (1979-1988), ruled the country for nearly forty years as dictators.42  
Yet even under these dictatorial rulers, South Korea became a successful 
industrial economy and quickly broadened and deepened its democratic 
                                                                                                                                                 
32  Id. 
33  Id. 
34  See generally Myounghag Chang, Post-Liberation Political Situation and Schism in Democratic 
Republicanism: Left-Right Ideological Confrontation and Korean National Unification, 8 E. ASIA POL. & 
IDEOLOGY REV. 239 (2009) (S. Kor.). 
35  See generally Won-mo Kim, The Establishment of the Republic of Korea by Syngman Rhee·Kim 
ku·Kwangsoo Lee and the Attempt Unification of Korea by Kim Il-sung’s Military Force, 9 CHUNWON RES. 
J. 53 (2016) (S. Kor.). 
36  Hojin Choi, The Judicial System in the End of Chosun Dynasty and Before the Independence, 16 
KOREAN PUB. ADMIN. HIST. REV. 223 (2005) (S. Kor.). 
37  Id. 
38  Han-Tae Lee, Economic Constitution and Constitutional Value of Economic Democratization, 20 
SEOUL L. REV. 1, 15 (2013) (S. Kor.). 
39  The Korean War has never ended officially; instead, a truce agreement was made between the 
U.N. and North Korea and serves to impede active warfare. 
40  Dong Chun Kim, Facing 60th Anniversary of the Korean War: The Korean Peninsula and the 
World, 91 HIST. CRITICISM 152, 162–64 (2010) (S. Kor.). 
41  Id. at 164–70. 
42  See generally Han-Joo Lee, Dealing with the Past of Authoritarian Rule in South Korea, 2 J. 
CONST. L. 32, 49–80 (2015) (S. Kor.). 
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scope.43  Despite South Korea being a formal democracy, these authoritarian 
regimes were more concerned with controlling crimes and paid little 
attention to criminal procedure, particularly the due process of law.44  The 
criminal justice system lacked substantive justice because, ultimately, a 
dictator controlled the system.45  
 
 More specifically, the outward fairness of the criminal justice system 
in South Korea, as seen in the constitution and in criminal procedure, was 
ultimately tainted by the corrupting influence of the authoritarian regimes.46  
These regimes successfully forced courts to render the regimes’ preferred 
rulings.47  In particular, courts responded to pressure from the regimes by 
fabricating charges against political opponents and sentencing people to 
lifetime imprisonment or capital punishment.  For example, during President 
Rhee’s lengthy tenure in office, a prominent politician, Mr. Cho, ran against 
the President.  He was arrested on the basis of being part of the “pro-North 
Korea faction” in 1958.48  Even though most of his and his colleagues’ 
charges were fabricated, Mr. Cho was found guilty of espionage and 
sentenced to execution in 1959.49  The first chief justice of the Supreme 
Court, Byong-ro Kim, criticized the government’s actions as perverting the 
justice of the criminal courts.50  The Supreme Court later decided to retry 
Mr. Cho’s case and found him not guilty, admitting the wrongdoing of the 
Court in rendering a guilty verdict.51 
 
The next dictator of South Korea, President Park, was also infamous 
for his use of the criminal courts as a means for suppressing his political 
opponents.52  President Park, following the example from the Meiji 
                                                 
43  Tom Ginsburg, Dismantling the “Developmental State”? Administrative Procedure Reform in 
Japan and Korea, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 585, 587 (2001); Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Sun Woo Lee & Won 
Kyung Chang, Participatory Governance in South Korea: Legal Infrastructure, Economic Development, 
and Dispute Resolution, 19 PAC. McGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 375, 376 (2007).   
44  Kuk Cho, The Unfinished “Criminal Procedure Revolution” of Post-Democratization in South 
Korea, 30 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 377, 377–78 (2002). 
45  Iltae Hur, A Study on the History and Thought of ‘Nullum crimen sine lege’ Principles, 35 
KYUNGPOOK NAT’L U. L. J. 142 (2011) (S. Kor.). 
46  H. Lee, supra note 42, at 63–71 (S. Kor.). 
47  Sang Hie Han, How Can the Korean People Have More Independent & More Accountable 
Judiciary?, 16 J. CONST. L. 409, 413–15 (2015) (S. Kor.). 
48  See GREGORY HENDERSON, KOREA: THE POLITICS OF THE VORTEX 215 (1968).   
49  See WON SOON PARK, DOCUMENTARY OF THE BARBARIC DAYS 273–98 (2006) (S. Kor.).   
50  Cho, supra note 2, at 178.   
51  Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008JaeDo11, Jan. 20, 2011 (S. Kor.). 
52  Kyungkeun Kang, Returning to the Constitutional Value and Order, 11 REV. INSTITUTION & 
ECON. 163, 163–67 (2017) (S. Kor.). 
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Restoration, declared “the Reformation Regime” in 1972, which established 
him as a de facto permanent President.  The regime regularly disregarded the 
boundary between the executive and the judiciary, and brought fabricated 
charges against innumerable democratic leaders and students.53  A 
particularly important case was that against the People’s Revolution Party 
Rebuilding Committee (“PRP”).54  In 1974, the Korean Central Intelligence 
Agency arrested and tortured some PRP members.55  They acted on the 
unfounded suspicion that the PRP had a communist connection with North 
Korea and was conspiring to foment a communist revolution in South 
Korea.56  In 1975, the Supreme Court rendered a final guilty decision against 
eight members of the PRP.57  Within twenty-four hours of the decision, the 
eight individuals were executed.58  The public called this “judicial murder”59 
because the corrupt criminal justice system led to their deaths.   
 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, after the dictators’ reins over the 
country were loosened, democratically-elected civilian presidents had the 
opportunity to overhaul the criminal justice system.60  However, these 
presidents did not make meaningful attempts to do so, nor did they achieve 
real success at restructuring the system until the late 1990s.61  This failure of 
democratically-elected presidents to fix the system further eroded public 
trust in the “justice” conferred by the criminal justice system.62   
 
 Between the dictators’ stranglehold on the judiciary and the failure of 
subsequent presidents to act immediately to reform the criminal justice 
system, the public felt a need to become directly involved in reformation.63  
 
                                                 
53  Cho, supra note 2, at 178; H. Lee, supra note 42, at 63–66. 
54  See Kuk Cho, Transitional Justice in Korea: Legally Coping with Past Wrongs After 
Democratization, 16 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 579, 592–93 (2007).   
55  See generally Seung-Yong Oh, State Violence and the Victimhood of Its Family: The Case of the 
Committee to Reestablish the People’s Revolutionary Party, 10 KOREAN SOC’Y FOR THE STUDY OF HIST.  
199 (2008) (S. Kor.). 
56  Id. 
57  Id. at 200; Cho, supra note 44, at 178–79. 
58  Cho, supra note 2, at 178–79.   
59  CATHOLIC HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, JUDICIAL MURDER: THE MASSACRE OF APRIL 1975 164–
65 (2001) (S. Kor.).   
60  Jin-Ho Chun, The Criminal Procedure Act Amendments and the Proper Role of Justice, 23 
KYUNGPOOK NAT’L U. L. J. 25, 25–26 (2005) (S. Kor.). 
61  Id. at 28; Mi Hwa Chung, Special Issue: Current Issues on Judicial Reformation Bill: Introduction 
and Perspective, 55 L. ASS’N  J. 19, 24 (2006) (S. Kor.). 
62  Chung, supra note 61, at 25. 
63  Id. at 33–35. 
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2.   Allowing People to be Involved in the Criminal Justice 
System 
 
The Presidential Commission on Judicial Reform (“Commission”) 
and the Presidential Committee on Judicial Reform (“Committee”) were 
formed in 1999 and 2005, respectively.64  Together, they functioned as the 
major players in the judicial reform movement sweeping South Korea in the 
early twenty-first century.65  The Commission focused on overall reform, 
including creating a unitary system of lawyers, eradicating corruption, and 
training future legal professionals.66  The Committee prepared complete 
proposals focused on the reform of legal services and citizen participation in 
the criminal justice system.67  
 
Most of the reformists in South Korea were convinced that the best 
way to restore the public’s confidence in the system was through a paradigm 
shift towards public participation in governance, including the judicial 
process.68  Some reformists suggested there should be public involvement in 
the appointment of specific judges.69  Other reformers thought the best 
solution was for the public to adopt the role of overseeing court 
procedures.70  Ultimately, the reformers decided that incorporating jury trials 
was the most effective way for the public to participate in the criminal 
justice system because it allowed lay people to be directly involved.71  
Following the work of the Commission and the Committee, the Act on the 
Establishment & Management of Professional Law Schools and the Act on 
Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials were enacted in 2007 and 2008, 
respectively.72  Since 2008, jury trials have been a part of South Korea’s 
criminal justice system.73  
 
                                                 
64  Chun, supra note 60, at 25–26. 
65  Kyeong Ok Choi, Judicial Reform and Its Problems in Korea, 8 YOUNGSAN L. J. 3, 5–6 (2011) (S. 
Kor.). 
66  See generally Chung, supra note 61, at 21–50. 
67  Id. at 33–35. 
68  Bingham, Lee & Chang, supra note 43, at 376. 
69  See generally Myeong-Sik Kim, A Study on the Balance between Judicial Independence and 
Democratic Accountability: Focused on Debates about the State Judge Election System in the United 
States, 22 STUDY ON AM. CONST. 1 (2011) (S. Kor.). 
70  Choi, supra note 65, at 6–7. 
71  Chun, supra note 60, at 28. 
72  Choi, supra note 65, at 5–6. 
73  Cha, supra note 16, at 168. 
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Article 1 of the Act on Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials 
provides: “the purpose of this Act is to clarify the power and responsibilities 
of citizens who take part in criminal trials under the participatory trial 
system that is hereby adopted to raise democratic legitimacy and confidence 
in judicial process and to provide for special cases for trial procedure and 
other necessary matters.”74  This was an ambitious textual attempt to connect 
the criminal jury trial with democracy.75  Unfortunately, this link is both 
incomplete and weak because, while unelected judges do not represent the 
will of the people, official jurors are also not elected, and therefore, do not 
actually represent the people’s will either.76  
 
In addition, the notion of democracy being realized through criminal 
jury trials can be misguided because “mock” justice often occurs in court 
due to the participation of lay people.  For example, in a famous case 
brought against a Superintendent of Education in Seoul, Mr. Heeyeon Cho, 
the jury rendered a guilty verdict, therefore risking Mr. Cho’s seat as the 
Superintendent.77  The jury in the first trial decided that Mr. Cho had 
violated78  an article from the Local Education Public Official Election 
Act.79 However, the sentence was suspended by the appellate court,80 which 
was then affirmed by the Supreme Court.81  The case against Mr. Cho 
demonstrates the misplaced feeling that criminal jury trials are the most 
effective way to realize democracy in the judiciary and shows that reflecting 
the people’s will by institutionalizing the criminal jury does not necessarily 
bring about democratic and just results.82 
 
 
                                                 
74  Act on Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials, art. 1. 
75  Cha, supra note 16, at 169–76. 
76  A majority of legal scholars argues that the advisory nature of juries’ verdicts and sentencing 
opinions makes the Act constitutional. Jong-Hyun Kim, A Thought on the Citizen Participation in Criminal 
Trials from Constitutional Perspective: Focused on Eligible Cases and Debate on Its Reform, 57 L. REV. 
75, 82 (2015) (S. Kor.). 
77  Seoul Central District Court [Dist. Ct.], 2014GoHap1415, Apr. 27, 2015 (S. Kor.). 
78  HoJin Yoon, “Go Seung Deok Heowi Bibang” Cho Hui Yeon, Gyoyukgamjik Yuji [“False 
Slanderer of Seungdeok Go” Heeyeon Cho, Remains Superintendent of Education], JOONGANG DAILY, 
Dec. 28, 2016, http://news.joins.com/article/21051318.   
79  Public Official Election Act, Act. No. 14073, Mar. 3, 2016 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea 
Legislation Research Institute online database, http://elaw.klri.re.kr/kor_service/lawView.do?hseq=38405 
&lang=ENG.   
80  Seoul High Court [Seoul High Ct.], 2015No1385, Sept. 4, 2015 (S. Kor.). 
81  Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2015Do14375, Dec. 27, 2016 (S. Kor.). 
82  Jibong Lim, Casting Doubts on Candidates in Public Official Election and Defining Limits on the 
Freedom of Expression, 7 YONSEI J. PUB. GOVERNANCE & L. 111, 119 (2016) (S. Kor.). 
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3.   Reform Comes with Constitutional Challenges   
 
There is no provision in South Korea’s Constitution supporting 
criminal jury trials.83  Thus, immediately after judicial reform was completed 
through legislation, the Act on Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials84 was 
challenged as unconstitutional.85  While the Act provides a means for jury 
trial, it alone is insufficient in providing the right to a jury trial; indeed, true 
criminal justice reform via participatory justice requires a constitutional 
amendment providing for the right to a jury trial.86  The public’s direct 
involvement in the criminal justice system can never be presumed as 
reasonable without a clause for direct delegation of authority in the 
constitution. 
 
A fundamental issue raised in opposition to jury trials is whether the 
Constitution allows lay people to take on the role of provisional judges.87  
While one of the arguments in favor of lay juries is that jurors’ lack of 
knowledge of case details before being impaneled may reduce bias, this was 
not open for discussion when the Constitution was enacted.   
 
i. There is No Constitutional Right to a Jury Trial 
 
 While criminal jury trials were implemented in Japan in the early 
twentieth century,88 the founding fathers of the South Korean Constitution 
did not consider including them in the Constitution, despite the continued 
influence of Japanese-style judicial proceedings and the United States 
military; the Constitution does not provide a right to a jury trial by one’s 
own peers.89  Additionally, subsequent amendments to the Constitution 
never reflected the idea of participatory justice in the criminal justice 
system.90  Only the Act provides a legal basis for a jury trial.91   
 
                                                 
83  J. Kim, supra note 76, at 82. 
84  See generally Act on Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials. 
85  Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 2008HunBa12, Nov. 26, 2009 (S. Kor.). 
86  Although the Constitutional Court declares the Act constitutional, it does point out that there is no 
constitutional right to a jury trial. Id. 
87  J. Kim, supra note 76, at 83. 
88  See generally Chang-Kook Kwon, The Study on the Japanese Jury Law (Bai-Shinn Hou, 1923), 26 
J. SOC. SCI. 49 (2010) (S. Kor.). 
89  Il Hwan Kim, A Constitutional Study on the Improvement of the Act on Citizen Participation in 
Criminal Trials, 18 CONST. L. J. 309, 313 (2012) (S. Kor.). 
90  Id. 
91  Id. at 316–17. 
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Embedded in the Act, however, are the means by which a court may 
act on its discretion to reject a jury trial.92  Articles 9 and 11 provide the 
courts with broad discretion to reject a request for a jury trial.93  Article 9(1) 
states that a court may “decide not to proceed to a participatory trial” given 
particular conditions.  These conditions are fairly broad.  If the court finds, 
for example, that “a juror . . . has difficulties in attending a trial” or, even 
more broadly, “if it is considered inappropriate to proceed to a participatory 
trial due to any other cause or event,” it can decide not to grant the 
participatory trial.94  Similarly, Article 11(1) provides that the court has 
broad discretion to transfer a case tried by a jury to bench trial.95  According 
to Article 11(3), any court decision based on Article 11(1) cannot be 
challenged.96 
  
The Act provides the sole legal means by which the accused can 
choose a jury trial.  Even when the Act provides for a jury trial, the lack of a 
constitutional protection of jury trials means that wishes of the accused are 
still subject to the court’s discretion.97  Thus, the primary way to fully 
establish criminal jury trials as a part of the justice system is to amend the 
Constitution to provide for the right to a jury trial.98  Without this 
amendment, any request for a jury trial is subject to the discretion of the 
court and the legitimacy of the criminal jury trial in South Korea is at risk of 
perpetual criticism.   
 
                                                 
92  J. Kim, supra note 76, at 82. 
93  Act on Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials, arts. 9, 11. 
94  Article 9(1) reads: “A court may decide not to proceed to a participatory trial for a period 
beginning after an indictment is filed and ending on the day after the closing of preparatory proceedings for 
a trial in any of the following cases: (1) If a juror, an alternate juror, or a prospective juror has difficulties in 
attending a trial or is unlikely to be able to duly perform his/her duties under this Act because of a violation 
or likely violation of the life, body, or property of the juror, alternate juror, prospective juror, or any of 
his/her family members; (2) If some of the accomplices do not want a participatory trial and it is considered 
difficult to proceed to a participatory trial; (3) If a victim of any offense prescribed in Article 2 of the Act 
on Special Cases concerning the Punishment, etc. of Sexual Crimes is committed, or his/her legal 
representative does not want a participatory trial; (4) If it is considered inappropriate to proceed to a 
participatory trial due to any other cause or event.” Id. art. 9. 
95  Article 11(1) reads: “If proceedings of a trial have been suspended for a long time due to the 
defendant’s illness or any other cause, if the period of confinement of the defendant expires, if a court is to 
protect a victim of a sexual crime, or if it is considered inappropriate to continue a participatory trial in 
view of circumstances of a trial due to any other cause or event, the court may decide to remove the case, at 
its discretion or at the request of the prosecutor, the defendant, or defense counsel, so that a collegiate panel 
of the competent district court can make a judgment on the case without a participatory trial.” Id. art. 11. 
96  Article 11(3) provides : “No objection may be raised against a decision made pursuant to 
paragraph (1).” Id. 
97  Id. 
98  I. Kim, supra note 89, at 313. 
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ii.  Juries Are Not Currently Authorized to Adjudicate 
Criminal Cases 
  
The most fundamental constitutional challenge to the use of criminal 
jury trials is disagreement about whether jurors are authorized to handle 
criminal cases.  Article 27(1) of the Constitution provides: “[a]ll citizens 
shall have the right to be tried in conformity with the Act by judges qualified 
under the Constitution and the Act.”99  However, the meaning of the term 
“judges” in this context is subject to fierce debate.100  
 
This Article, along with a minority of criminal law and criminal 
procedure scholars, have suggested that the fact that the Constitution also 
provides for the qualification, independence, and powers of judges in 
Articles 101–110 confirms that the term “judges” in Article 27 refers only to 
professional judges.101  Accordingly, a jury composed of lay persons is never 
constitutionally qualified as a “professional judge.”102  
 
Conversely, the majority of criminal law, criminal procedure, and 
constitutional law scholars have expressed the view that the people’s interest 
trumps the lack of an explicitly enumerated right to a jury trial in the 
Constitution.103  According to them, the term “judges” in Article 27 of the 
Constitution is not limited to professional judges.104  Since the Constitution 
defines who the “judges” are, the Constitution grants legislative power to the 
National Assembly to enact laws interpreting the term “judges.”105  The Act 
on Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials is the type of legislative action 
provided for by the term “the Act” in the Constitution.106  These scholars 
also argue that juries engaging in activities such as rendering advisory 
verdicts and opinions regarding sentencing are not engaging in the type of 
adjudication limited to professional judges.107  They further argue that, as 
long as professional judges are involved in the adjudication process, direct 
involvement of the people is not unconstitutional.108  
                                                 
99  DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] [CONSTITUTION] art. 27 (S. Kor.). 
100  See Ho Hyun Park, The Constitutional Discourse Related in the Civil Participation in Criminal 
Jury Trial, 17 HONGIK L. REV. 423, 423 (2016).   
101  I. Kim, supra note 89, at 314. 
102  Park, supra note 100, at  434–35. 
103  I. Kim, supra note 89, at 314–16. 
104  Id. at 315. See also Park, supra note 100, at 435; J. Kim, supra note 76, at 82. 
105  D. Lee, supra note 9, at 91. 
106  Id. 
107  I. Kim, supra note 89, at 315. See also Park, supra note 100, at 435; J. Kim, supra note 76, at 82. 
108  I. Kim, supra note 89, at 315.   
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This interpretation of the Constitution, however, is undermined by 
legislation that indicates that, even with a jury trial, judges remain 
independent in their final decisions.  For example, Article 46(5) of the Act 
states that “[n]o verdict and opinions [delivered by a lay jury] under 
paragraphs (2) through (4) shall be binding on the court.”109  By providing 
for an advisory rather than mandatory effect of a jury verdict and sentencing 
opinion, the legislature created a work-around that ensured there would be 
no conflict with the Constitution by giving final authority of deciding any 
case to professional judges.110  This advisory effect was challenged by the 
majority of criminal law, criminal procedure, and constitutional law scholars 
because without mandatory power, the criminal jury trial might simply be a 
hollow system that the bench could disregard whenever it wishes.111  But, 
even with more than ninety percent of jury decisions matching the judge’s 
final judgment in criminal cases,112 constitutional concern will not go away 
without amending the Constitution itself.113  For that reason, the current 
system of providing the jury’s verdict and sentencing opinion as only 
advisory is unconstitutional.  A constitutional amendment that includes lay 
juries as a kind of judge is the only way to resolve any constitutional 
concern.  Amending the Constitution to include lay people as a kind of judge 
would give mandatory power to admit their verdict no matter what.   
 
iii. The Court is Not Capable of Handling the Case 
Influx114 
  
Prior to the Act, the expected annual number of criminal jury cases 
was less than 300 cases nationwide.115  However, the number of cases 
referred to criminal jury trial was too small to determine. Therefore, it is 
difficult to meaningfully consider the huge amount of total criminal cases 
per year.  In 2008, the first year that criminal jury trials were allowed, only 
sixty-four cases nationwide were referred to a jury trial.116  This number 
increased to 345 in 2013, when the Act was amended to extend the range of 
                                                 
109  Act on Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials, art. 46(5).   
110  See generally Jae-Jung Kim, A Study on the Present Condition and Measures of Civil 
Participation in Criminal Trial in Korea, 49 CHONBUK L. REV. 191 (2016) (S. Kor.). 
111  D. Lee, supra note 8, at 91–93. 
112  Id. at 76; Park, supra note 100, at 440. 
113  I. Kim, supra note 89, at 331–36. 
114  J. Kim, supra note 110, at 196–97. 
115  D. Lee, supra note 8, at 72. 
116  Id. at 74. 
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eligible cases.117  Since 2013, the trend of more criminal jury trials has 
reversed.  In 2015, only 203 cases involved criminal jury trials.118  From 
2008 to 2015, less than two percent of eligible cases have been disposed of 
by a jury.119  Courts expect the number of jury trials to increase.120  
However, this expectation is not realistic, because criminal jury trials are 
very different than bench trials and the courts are not prepared to tackle the 
maximum number of jury trials.121 
  
Criminal jury trials are very different from the bench trials typically 
adjudicated in South Korean courts.122  For example, jury trials require a 
court to allocate significantly more time to proceedings and deliberations.123  
Conversely, a court can dispose of more than ten bench trials per day.124  
Indeed, sometimes bench trials are allocated less than ten minutes per trial 
date.125  If there is witness testimony or a dispute of fact, the time can be 
extended.126  However, there are limits to the availability of an extension 
because of the other cases that need to be adjudicated the same day.127  In 
contrast, a court devotes an entire day to a single criminal jury trial.128  Even 
if the issue is very simple, it takes at least a whole court day to finish one 
case.129  In addition, prior to the trial date, a court has a preliminary hearing 
to pinpoint important issues.130  Furthermore, there is a limited number of 
courts capable of taking jury trial cases.131  Although in theory any three-
judge panel could adjudicate a jury trial, only certain panels of judges take 
jury trials because their dockets are already full.132  Current benches are not 
                                                 
117  Subparagraph 1 of Article 5(1) of the Act was amended to include “cases falling under the 
juridiction of a collegiate panel.” Act on Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials, art. 5(1).   
118  D. Lee, supra note 8, at 74. 
119  Id.; In-Gon Lee, A Brief Thought on the Revised Act of Korean Jury Trial System, 17 L. REV. 245, 
249 (2017) (S. Kor.). 
120  J. Kim, supra note 110, at 197; I. Lee, supra note 119, at 249. 
121  Ho-Hyun Park, Myeong-Dae Kim & Jong-Ho Kim, A Study on the Civil Participation in Criminal 
Trial: Focused on Precedent Analysis, 33 J. L. RES. 57 (2017) (S. Kor.). 
122  Cha, supra note 16, at 181. 
123  D. Lee, supra note 8, at 86–87. 
124  Id. at 90. 
125  Jin-Yeon Chung, Role Comparison of the Parties in Litigation between the Korean Jury System 
and Criminal Litigation, 19 SOONGSIL L. REV. 133, 140–41 (2008) (S. Kor.). 
126  See generally In-Young Lee, Consideration of Ideology and Practical Tasks in Principle of Court-
Oriented Trials and Practice Subjects, 8 THEORIES & PRAC. CRIM. PROC. 27, 28–40 (2016) (S. Kor.). 
127  Id. 
128  I. Lee, supra note 119, at 259. 
129  Id. at 270. 
130  Id. at 259–60. 
131  D. Lee, supra note 8, at 85. 
132  Id. 
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capable of handling an influx of jury trial cases if the range of eligible cases 
provided for in the Act becomes too wide.133  Therefore, it is necessary to 
have a “reasonable” range of cases or “right number of cases” per year.  The 
“reasonableness” in this context has long been debated,134 and amendments 
only appear to exacerbate this division.  This is why the Act did not amend 
subparagraph 4 of Article 9(1), which gives the courts discretionary power 
to exclude the petitions if “it is considered inappropriate to proceed to a 
participatory trial due to any other cause or event.”135    
 
B. Stage Two: Initiation 
  
 The Act on Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials was effectuated in 
January 2008.  By July 2017, the Act had been amended eight times.136  
These amendments added several precautionary measures to avoid granting 
defendants’ requests for jury trials when judges hope to exercise their 
discretion to adjudicate as a bench trial.137  The most vital provision gave 
only advisory power to a jury verdict and has been challenged because its 
inconsistent structure undermined the legislative intent of the Act, which 
gives the control of power in criminal justice to the people.138  Below, this 
Article discusses the most crucial issues and provisions in the Act that have 
been challenged throughout the amendment process. 
 
1. The Act Has Not Been Amended to Allow for Fully 
Mandatory Power by Juries  
   
A jury verdict and opinion on sentencing are not binding on the court 
because of the constitutional challenge specified in Stage One.  These two 
elements of jury decisions are only advisory pursuant to Article 46(5) of the 
Act.  Multiple attempts by scholars to create a more authoritative role for 
juries have not been successful.139  
 
                                                 
133  Id. at 94. 
134  J. Kim, supra note 110, at 197. It has been considered that courts should take any number of cases 
if all the cases are appropriate or reasonable to adjudicate as jury trials. However, the expectation for the 
actual number of cases was not noted.   
135  Act on Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials, art. 9. 
136  See generally Act on Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials.   
137  D. Lee, supra note 8, at 70–72. 
138  I. Kim, supra note 89, at 333. 
139  See generally Dong-Hee Lee, The Achievements and Challenges of the Citizen Participatory Trial 
in Korea, 146 JUSTICE 69 (2015) (S. Kor.); D. Lee, supra note 8, at 91–93. 
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Both Supreme Court and lower court opinions have held that, while 
these decisions by juries are not binding, they cannot easily be disregarded 
by judges.140  In 2010, the Supreme Court ruled that, although a jury verdict 
is not binding, it is “near-mandatory;”141  that is, if the unanimous verdict is 
in line with the judge’s decision, it cannot be overturned in the appellate 
court.142  Lower courts have similarly taken the view that jury verdicts and 
sentencing opinions must not be disregarded by judges.  In a case rendered 
in Daejun High District Court, the court held that even if a lower court 
decision against considering the defendant’s argument for his inadequate 
mental capacity had some merit, the Court would maintain the sentencing 
opinion accepted by the lower court.143  The Seoul High District Court even 
held that if a court decision was made that was not in harmony with a 
unanimous not guilty jury verdict, the court’s decision of guilt should be 
overturned.144  The Supreme Court Committee on People’s Participation 
ultimately noted that the jury verdict holds de facto binding effect, rather 
than de jure binding effect.145  The attempt to provide mandatory power for 
jury verdicts and jury sentencing opinions by amending the Act failed due to 
the constitutional challenges noted in Stage One.   
 
2. The Act Does Not Provide the Right to a Jury 
 
In South Korea, the accused has no constitutional right to be tried by a 
jury and cannot be forced to submit to a trial by their own peers.146  Article 8 
of the Act allows the defendant to apply for a jury trial.147  Article 9 provides 
that trial courts ultimately decide whether a trial will be pursued by a jury or 
by the bench.148 
  
The Supreme Court rendered a series of decisions clarifying the 
process by which a judge decides whether to send a case to a jury trial.149  It 
required a lower court to confirm that a defendant wished to proceed with a 
                                                 
140  D. Lee, supra note 7, at 94. 
141  Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2009Do14065, Mar. 25, 2010 (S. Kor.). 
142  Id. 
143  Daejun High District Court [Dist. Ct.], 2008No123, 2008GamNo18, May 28, 2008 (S. Kor.). 
144  Seoul High District Court [Seoul High Ct.], 2013No2133, May 23, 2014 (S. Kor.). 
145  D. Lee, supra note 8, at 83. 
146  Id. 
147  Act on Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials, art. 8. 
148  Id. art. 9.  
149  Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2012Do13869, Jan. 31, 2013 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 
2011Do15484, June 14, 2012 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2012Do1225, Apr. 26, 2012 (S. Kor.).   
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jury trial; without this, the whole procedure could be void.150  The appeals 
court can cure the flaw if the defendant shows his intent not to take issue 
with the flaw and clarifies his intent to have a bench trial.151  This, 
unfortunately, is a flawed ruling, because it is a principle of criminal justice 
that serious illegality cannot be fixed in a later proceeding.152  The only way 
to explain the holding allowing “rectif[ication] of the wrongs of not properly 
proceeding with the defendant’s request for jury trial” is that the jury trial is 
neither a duty nor a right awarded to the accused, and that is why the Court 
can reinstate already tainted procedure with later validation.153  
  
3. The Act was Amended to Have More Criminal Jury Trial 
Cases 
 
Before the Act was enacted, the expected number of cases handled by 
jury trials was at least 300 cases per year.  However, the actual number of 
cases handled by juries is far smaller than expected.  As a result, the 
influence of the jury trial over the entire criminal justice system is 
minimized.154  In 2012, Article 5 of the Act was amended to include most of 
the cases that would be tried by a panel of three judges to facilitate an 
increase in the proportion of criminal trials sent to a jury.155  However, as 
noted previously, such an amendment gives rise to serious concern about the 
number of cases courts can adjudicate using a jury given their limited 
capacity.156 
 
Before the 2012 Amendment, only first-degree murder and 
manslaughter cases were eligible for jury trials.157  Focusing upon the most 
serious crimes traces back to the common law tradition of giving the right of 
jury trials only to defendants accused of felonies.158  The Amendment is 
thought to have contributed to the increase in criminal jury trials in 2013.  
                                                 
150  Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2012Do1225, Apr. 26, 2012 (S. Kor.). 
151  Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2011Do15484, June 14, 2012 (S. Kor.). 
152  For example, Article 308-2 of the Criminal Procedure Act notes that illegally obtained evidence 
cannot be admissible in court and a later concession for the use of evidence cannot be acknowledged.  
Hyongsa sosong beob [Criminal Procedure Act], Act No. 341, Sept. 23, 1954, amended by Act No. 8496, 
June 1, 2007, art. 308-2 (S. Kor.), translated in Korean Legislation Research Institute online 
database, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/main.do (search required).   
153  Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2012Do13869, Jan. 31, 2013 (S. Kor.). 
154  J. Kim, supra note 110, at 197. 
155  I. Kim, supra note 89, at 322. 
156  D. Lee, supra note 8, at 85. 
157  I. Lee, supra note 119, at 247. 
158  Id. 
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But, since that year, the number has decreased.159  The Supreme Court of 
South Korea is currently considering ways to increase the proportion of 
criminal jury trials.160  
 
4. Victims of Crimes Should be Given the Right to 
Participate 
 
While a bench trial is painful for any victim because they must testify 
in court, a criminal jury trial is even harder because of the direct 
involvement of strangers: the jury.161  Further, the role of the witness/victim 
is even more important in a criminal trial.  The witness/victim, in testifying 
in open court, often re-lives the horror of the crime.162  Victims of sex crimes 
tend to suffer the most when they have to testify in court.163  Thus, when 
Article 5 of the Act was amended to increase the number of jury trial cases, 
Article 9(1)(3) was amended to provide that “[i]f a victim of any offense 
prescribed in Article 2 of the Act on Special Cases concerning the 
Punishment, etc. of Sexual Crimes is committed, or his/her legal 
representative does not want a participatory trial,” a court may exercise its 
discretion not to proceed to a participatory trial.164  This new amendment is 
meant to address the concern that victims of sex crimes should have a say in 
a court’s decision to accept a jury trial application made by a defendant.   
  
This amendment giving sex crime victims the right to be involved 
affirms that a jury trial is not a right, and restricts the strategic moves a 
defendant might make when choosing a jury trial over a bench trial.  
However, the Supreme Court recently limited the exclusion decision based 
on Article 9(1)(3) by holding that the court’s exercise of discretion based 
solely on the demand made by sex crime victims or lawyers may not be 
sufficient to legalize the exclusion decision.165  Instead, the court must 
consider factors such as (1) the specific reason for moving to exclude, (2) 
the relationship between the accused and the victims, (3) the mental status of 
                                                 
159  D. Lee, supra note 8, at 74. 
160  The Supreme Court commissioned a study to increase the number of defendants applying for jury 
trials. The study, titled “A Study on Facilitating the Number of Defendant’s Application for Criminal Jury 
Trials,” is expected to be published later this year, and I was honored to be a part of the group for the study.   
161  See generally Choon-Hwa Lee, A Study on the Issues and the Improvement Plans of Korean Jury 
Trial for the Sex Offense, 23 KOREAN J. CRIMINOLOGY 65 (2011) (S. Kor.). 
162  Id. at 70–71. 
163  See generally Jessica D. Khan, He Said, She Said, She Said: Why Pennsylvania Should Adopt 
Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414, 52 VIL. L. REV. 641 (2007). 
164  Act on Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials, art. 9. 
165  Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2015Do2898, Mar. 16, 2016 (S. Kor.). 
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victims and the age of victim, and (4) whether other preventive measures 
were provided to prevent secondary victimization.166   These four categories 
should be considered in deciding whether to deny the defendant’s 
application for jury trials in sex crime cases.  In this decision, the Supreme 
Court indicated that it expects courts to be cautious when denying requests 
by the accused for a jury trial.167  The Supreme Court’s cautious position that 
the right to jury trial given to sex crime defendants must be protected shows 
a confusing state on the status of the right to jury trial.   
 
C. Stage Three: Implementation 
 
The initial goal of including the jury trial was to transform the entire 
criminal justice system to restore the public’s confidence in the judiciary.168  
However, this goal has not been achieved because the proportion of criminal 
jury trials has been lower than anticipated.169  The fact that all parties in the 
system have different views on the purpose of the jury trial also undermines 
the jury trial’s impact on the criminal justice system.   
 
The role an individual plays in the trial affects his or her perspective 
on the contribution of jury trials in the criminal justice system.170  For 
example, judges view jury trials as an opportunity to be involved in the case 
in a different way.171  However, each judge approaches jury trials 
differently.172  This is likely due in part to the lack of detailed guidelines for 
jury trial procedure.173  Defendants may view jury trials as a strategic choice.  
They may assume that the general public is likely to have harsher views on 
punishment than judges, in which case they might avoid requesting jury 
trials.174  Lawyers generally view requesting jury trials as a risky move 
because juror decisions are unpredictable.  Finally, each party is well aware 
of the amended provisions of the Act discussed in Stage Two, which allow 
more cases to be tried by jury thanks to the expansion of eligible cases 
provided in Article 5 of the Act.  However, even though some meaningful 
changes were made, the outcome has been the same.175  It has been 
                                                 
166  Id. 
167  Id. 
168  See generally Yun & Kim, supra note 7. 
169  D. Lee, supra note 8, at 72–74. 
170  Chung, supra note 23, at 218–19. 
171  J. Kim, supra note 76, at 83. 
172  Id. 
173  D. Lee, supra note 8, at 80. 
174  C. Lee, supra note 161, at 72.       
175  D. Lee, supra note 8, at 74. 
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suggested that changes in law are not reflected in practice.176  It remains to 
be seen whether such legislative overhaul would bring any meaningful 
outcome changes, such as more judges granting the defendants’ wishes to 
have jury trials.   
  
D. Stage Four: Routinization 
 
While courts have been wrong in predicting the right number of 
criminal jury cases per year, they have always been publically willing to 
provide any means necessary to accommodate any number of cases.177  
However, their explicit attempt to hear more cases is not evidenced by the 
actual number of jury trials granted; the overall percentage of jury trial 
requests granted is about forty percent, and has been for five years.178  
Furthermore, the fact that courts are working to guarantee the legitimacy of 
jury verdicts and sentencing opinions does not seem to help the jury trial 
become a routine procedure in the criminal justice system.179  But there are 
many signs that the new system of criminal justice—the criminal jury trial—
has gained support from the bench and the public as a routine system, at 
least for the foreseeable future.180  
 
1. Most Jury Verdicts Correlate with Final Judicial 
Decisions 
 
Although the jury verdict is only advisory, more than ninety percent 
of jury verdicts since 2008 have been consistent with the holding of the 
judge.181  This percentage has remained consistent over time, despite 
amendments to the Act.182  Judges appear reluctant to disagree with juries 
because they respect the decision made by the defendants’ peers.183  Since 
any decision made by the jury cannot be easier to make than those made by 
the bench, this high level of correspondence is quite meaningful.184  It means 
that judges agree with juries on findings of fact.  This de facto mandatory 
power given to jury decisions has been cited as a sign of success for the 
                                                 
176  Id. 
177  Id. at 78–82. 
178  Id at 74. 
179  Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2012Do13869, Jan. 31, 2013 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 
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180  Cha, supra note 16, at 187–88. 
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criminal jury trial;185 it shows that courts have tried to control the issues 
settled by juries, ultimately leading juries to find facts and recommend 
sentences that courts would render by themselves.186  
 
2. Educating the Public 
  
Part of the original intent of the jury trial was to expose the general 
public to the criminal justice system.187  People who have served on juries 
generally view the experience as positive.188  However, this represents only a 
very small fraction of the population.  Some scholars even praise this small-
scale phenomenon as one which can be understood as an enormous 
success.189  However, it cannot be denied that the impact on the people is 
fairly limited, as few people have yet to serve on juries.190  The difficulty in 
routinizing the process of the criminal jury trial has been a driving force 
behind amendments to expand eligible jury cases under the Act.  
 
3. Number of Criminal Jury Trials are Still Negligible 
 
 Fewer than two percent of all criminal trials are jury trials.191  Thus, 
the original goal of transforming the criminal justice system with the 
criminal jury trial has not been realized.  Furthermore, future attempts to 
increase the number of criminal jury trials do not look promising, even after 
amending the Act to include more cases, as the current number of jury trials 
has not shown any meaningful increase.192  A constitutional amendment is 
necessary to make the jury the mandatory fact-finder for every felony 
case.193  
 
E. Stage Five: Evaluation 
 
The 2008 Act was a revolutionary attempt towards a participatory 
criminal justice system.  The willingness to immediately enforce the Act 
without further deliberation or a waiting period reflects the experimental 
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period of five years, after which the process was re-evaluated by a newly 
formed committee under the Supreme Court.194  Despite many scholars’ 
grim predictions, public perception of the Act was surprisingly positive, 
even if its real impact on the overall criminal justice system has been 
minimal.195 
 
 The future success of the criminal jury trial hinges on whether both 
the general public and legal professionals are confident enough in the 
benefits of jury trials to make them compulsory.196  Ultimately, the simple 
measure of amending the Act will be insufficient to silence the concerns 
about the constitutionality of jury trials.197  The only way to protect jury 
trials from these challenges is through a constitutional amendment 
enumerating the right to a jury trial for at least all cases eligible for a three-
judge panel, as provided in the Act.  In addition, to ease the minds of legal 
professionals, enough infrastructure must be in place to accommodate the 
influx of cases following a constitutional amendment mandating all felony 
cases be subject to a criminal jury trial.  Currently, the process of subjecting 
all cases eligible for a three-judge panel to criminal jury trials is undergoing 
a second test period.198 
 
This first revolutionary act of letting the public be directly involved in 
the criminal justice system has been praised as a success by both the public 
and legal scholars.199  However, the ambition of realizing democracy in the 
criminal justice system is not yet near being fulfilled.   
 
The basic premise that the inclusion of criminal jury trials is the best 
way to realize democracy in the criminal justice system may be based on a 
false assumption that the jury trial is the symbol of democracy in criminal 
justice system.  Though the premise may be flawed and the execution 
problematic, the people’s belief that criminal jury trials must be a standard 
for serious crimes has not changed after eight or nine years.  However, 
educating the public broadly has been less consistent.  Initially, courts were 
very enthusiastic about publicizing criminal jury trials by putting 
advertisements on television and raising public understanding about this type 
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of trial.200  However, after nearly ten years, visible campaigns or 
advertisements to publicize criminal jury trials are no longer a part of 
television.201 
  
There is, unfortunately, not enough legal training in general about the 
difference between facts and law.  Sufficient understanding with respect to 
the legal impact of some factual issues is necessary to ensure that final 
decisions are not the result of errors.  Better training and education of legal 
minds may be needed “even if this may lead to a reduction in the ‘fresh lay 
perspective.’”202  South Korea never had a meaningful opportunity to debate 
the rationale for instituting criminal jury trials, and therefore lay people need 
to be provided with some legal understanding to address a case in front of 
them.203  By doing this work, public confidence in criminal jury trials would 
become even stronger, and legal professionals’ uneasiness about the 
mandatory criminal jury trial would be allayed to a degree.  For that purpose, 
jury instructions must be more guided and transparent, and “legalese” must 
be translated into laymen’s terms.204  
III.  CONCLUSION 
Moving forward, a fundamental question is whether democracy 
should be a goal in the criminal justice system in any country.205  The 
ultimate goal of a criminal justice system in South Korea should be to realize 
justice, and there are times when democracy results in the sacrifice of 
accuracy.  Providing an opportunity for lay people might help to restore the 
peoples’ trust in the judiciary; however, it does not necessarily guarantee fair 
decisions.   
   
With a new administration taking office after the impeachment of 
former President Park, the President-elect Moon Jae-in announced that 2017 
and 2018 would be a time for contemplation and devising a new 
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Constitution.206  Unfortunately, including the right to jury trial in the 
Constitution is not predicted to be a priority for the incoming government.207  
The President and his administration side with the majority of scholars who 
consider it unnecessary to create a constitutional right to a jury trial because 
its current construction is sufficient for that purpose.208  Despite this 
prediction, people should realize that justice is not being served ideally with 
participation from the general public.  Participatory justice should not be a 
patch to restore the public confidence in the judiciary.  Instead, a full-scale 
attempt to have criminal jury trials for entire felony cases would do 
tremendous work to overhaul the entire criminal justice system.  In order to 
make this happen, the criminal justice system in South Korea needs more 
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